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Abstract: The contemporary debate in rent-seeking and corruption-related activities in Sub-Saharan 
Africa has focused so much on the so-called patrimonial question. According to scholars who have 
advanced this argument, African corruption is characterised by the notion of ‘neopatrimonialism’, 
which describes a resurgence of ethnic and tribal mutual support ties that work along traditional lines, 
thus exacerbating corruption. In this paper the author contends that the patrimonial argument is 
flawed as an explanation of African corruption and it seems to be advanced with the aim of eschewing 
contributory responsibility of forces in the developed world. A more viable outlook of rent-seeking and 
corruption should therefore focus on greed as a factor and be more inclusive by focusing on the 
culpability of all parties and groups. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The contemporary debate in rent-seeking activities in sub-Saharan Africa has focused so 
much on the so called patrimonial issue. This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by 
questioning the patrimonial label itself. We must however begin with an understanding of 
the phenomenon of rent-seeking from the perspective of economics and political ethics. 
Fukuyama (2011) traces the origin of the term to a practice in the French state in the 18th 
century in which government posts, military command positions and the right to collect 
taxes were sold to the highest bidder, giving birth to the French term rente to describe the 
practice of selling public assets and offices (Fukuyama, 2011: 339). A clear understanding of 
patrimonialism’s role in corruption in Africa as related to other factor of corruption can help 
us to understand how it works. This in turn can help us evaluate more accurately the 
contentions that corruption and rent-seeking in Africa work mainly on the basis of 
patrimonial patterns rather than on any other bases.    
 
THE PHENOMENON OF RENT-SEEKING 
According to the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics the term rent can variously be used 
in the field to define rents in general (for instance that paid for labour, land, equipment); 
economic rents (arising to goods whose price is determined by the demand and roughly 
equated to the profit). It is also used to define Ricardian rents, related to differences in rents 
in units of otherwise homogenous resources e.g. land of equal fertility attracting different 
values due to location or accessibility (Alchian, 1987: 143).  
 
Rent-seeking in the context of monopoly rents and as used in this paper is “the ability of 
individuals or enterprises to extract uncompensated wealth for non-productive activities 
from others over and above the marginal cost of the product” (Desta, 2012: 2). Another 
definition by Murphy et al. (1993) is “rent-seeking is an unproductive activity, aimed at 
redistribution of wealth created by others”. In the context of this paper the term “rent-
seeking” is also used synonymously with the term “corruption” as a way of emphasis and 
drawing the force of both. Some rent-seeking actions (like taking a travelling allowance from 
the employer without actually travelling as purported) may not entail directly corrupt 
actions but will qualify as rent-seeking activities.  
 
The term as used in this paper includes several rent-seeking and corrupt activities: Creation 
of artificial monopolies; using cartels to set prices at artificially high levels that do not reflect 
an interplay of supply and demand forces; using insider information to secure public assets 
‘on the cheap’; extortive acts to get a bribe or creation of circumstances and  avenues to give 
bribes with motives for higher future gains;  expropriation by private interests of what 
should otherwise remain in public domain and use of public facilities for private ends, or 
where legally entitled, using them extravagantly and below limits allowed by the law.  
 
An example is distributing favours and public slots to cronies and relatives (like public office 
or travel in otherwise official government business). It also includes using expensive means 
in undertaking government business where cheaper alternatives are available. Rent-seeking 
is a wasteful phenomenon that adds no value in the value chain, in consequence making 
both goods and services available at artificially higher prices, harming innovation and 
competitiveness and hence imposing undesirable burden on the consumer and the economy. 
 
This activity is known to have existed in the past centuries in Europe and the USA. Rothstein 
(2011) reports that in early 19th century Sweden it was normal for an individual in the civil 
service to hold up to six positions. What mattered was personal contacts with the king’s 
court rather than what law said. Public office in the military and the civil services was 
available for purchasing and selling (Rothstein, 2011: 111).  
 
UNDERSTANDING PATRIMONIALISM 
Patrimonialism is a social system in which a royal elite rules through personal and arbitrary 
control over a bureaucracy and over slaves, mercenaries, and conscripts who have no power 
themselves and serve only to enforce the monarch’s rule. The term has its origins from Max 
Weber’s works in sociology (Swedberg, 2005: 195). Its employment by political scientists to 
analyse ‘African’ rent-seeking activities corruption has been questioned not only by 
sociologist, but even by political scientists (Perrson & Sjösted, 2012; Rothstein, 2011; Blundo, 
2006; Williams, 1987).  
 
Some of the studies explaining rent-seeking in terms of neopatrimonialism are by Erdmann 
(2007); Gymah-Boadi (2007) and Nugent (2007); who point to the problem of elections in the 
countries surveyed (including among others Tanzania, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia, 
Ivory Coast, Mozambique and South Africa). These researchers argue that elections in these 
countries function only to perpetuate the rule of those in power and are also oblivious to 
electoral irregularities including illegal expenditure of money in form of gifts to electorates, 
reflecting patrimonial tendencies (Gymah-Boadi, 2007: 24-5; Erdmann, 2007: 45-8; Nugent, 
2007: 256-64).  
 
On their part Chabal and Daloz (2006 & 1999) correctly argue that disorder (including 
dysfunctionality of the state manifested by corruption). is used as a political instrument in 
Africa. They argue that patrimonialism and use of public employment as private resource 
are the norm rather than an exception, giving rise to totalitarianism emergence of ‘neo-
patrimonialism’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 1, 6-9, 12, 25, 32, 75, 95, 100-103).  (Their analysis 
excludes the Northern African ‘Arab world’ and South Africa). One important position of 
their studies is the observation that real politics tend to take place in a realm often 
overlooked by the political analyst: 
 
Here we propose the notion of ‘informalization’ of politics, in clear reference to the 
vast literature on the informal economy- because the parallel seems to us both 
apposite and enlightening…what is actually happening in the political realm in 
Africa is more often than not of an ‘informal’ or personalized nature (p. 1). 
 
Chabal and Daloz (1999) discount the argument that the state in Africa has managed to 
exercise hegemony. The duo argue instead, that it is the society that has captured the state in 
corrupt Africa, hence making it an opposite of the Weberian-Hobbesian-state in which the 
private is separate from the public and the political functionaries are compelled to exercise 
authority in the interest of the society (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 26). The duo’s other (rather 
illuminating) proposition that corruption in sub-Saharan Africa forms the process of 
instrumentalization of disorder, actually contradicts their view that society in Africa has 
captured the state. For instance, the contemporary picture properly analysed includes several 
more serious ‘captors’. The list may include shadowy political functionaries in flawed party 
political systems, MNCs and TNCs, venture capitalists, money speculators, land grabbers, oil 
and mineral explorers and extractors, as well as drug barons.  
 
The study (Clapham 1992). though more sympathetic in outlook than that by Chabal and 
Daloz (1999) and Herbst (2000); equally cites neopatrimonialism as a major problem that 
makes elimination or at least control of corruption in Africa a difficult if not impossible task. 
He continues (Clapham (1992): 
 
Any form of organisation, essential though it may be for the achievement of group 
and individual goals, and the management of conflicts between competing interests, 
itself produces inequalities of power, and thus further differences of interests 
between those who have more power and those who have less. (p. 1).   
 
THE PATRIMONIAL QUESTION IN RENT-SEEKING DEBATES 
Literature on the failures of third world politics has applied to African situations the idea of 
‘neopatrimonialism’ in African politics to describe a resurgence of ethnic and tribal mutual 
support ties that work along traditional lines, thus exacerbating corruption. It is further 
argued by proponents of this notion that what is appropriated through rent-seeking or 
corruption is redistributed more or less fairly and therefore everybody seems to gain 
something. They therefore advance an argument about existence of a ‘communitarianism of 
corruption’ and a ‘moral economy of corruption’ that also sees no point in reacting to the 
situation and rather accepts acquiescence and participation (Chabal and Daloz 2006, 267, 314-
5; 1999, 100).  
 
In his work, Hyden (2013) looks at African politics in different perspectives that take into 
account the rise and practice of political supremacy in their various stages: the party state, 
the development state, the efficient (or quest for the efficient state) and finally the democratic 
state (Hyden 2013, 29-41). He observes that at the top of politics and all the way down, a 
culture of the ‘Big Man Rule’ emerges characterised by clientelism, patrimonialism and 
personal accumulation (Hyden 2013, 103, 107). This paper seeks to contribute to this 
discussion, with some alternative conclusions. 
 
Some students of African politics and development have advanced the idea that 
patrimonialism should not be resisted but ought instead to be taken as ‘a given’ and reality. 
Development and governance efforts ought therefore, to understand it and make use of it to 
achieve development and political goals (Kelsall, Booth, Cammack & Golooba-Mutebi, 2010; 
Kelsall 2008).  These scholars’ analyses point one way or the other to the influence of 
patrimonialism on the level of corruption in Africa south of the Sahara. Their views however 
do not take regard of the fact that other cultures like Chinese, Indian and Arab/Middle 
eastern exhibit equally, or even stronger patriarchal ties, but have exhibited different 
patterns in corruption, evaluated on the basis of available data. What such analyses miss is 
the fact that neopatrimonialism is a contraption of the post-colonial state and has little to do 
with the patrimonial setup of the pre-colonial state on one hand and a misinterpretation of 
the ‘economy of affection’ properly understood, on the other (Sugimura, 2011, 29;  Hyden 
2013, 103, 107 & 2004, 6-7).  
 
PATRIMONIALISM’S CONNECTION TO RENT-SEEKING: AN IMBALANCED VIEW? 
Perrson & Sjösted (2012, 193) for example, question why and how Hong Kong and 
Singapore, two states with a strong oriental culture that has parallels to the patriarchal  
system and in which corruption was a normal way of life from the 1950s to the 1970s, 
managed to reasonably extricate themselves from the vice.  
 
Evidence, even within the works by the patrimonial scholars, indicate problems in Africa, 
just like anywhere else on the globe, to be on the major part connected with inept, selfish 
leaderships and uncaring businesses. This should partly discount the idea of any serious 
connections between exacerbated corruption in Africa and neopatrimonialism. The problem 
therefore seems to point to innate human greed and the inclination to exploit opportunities 
and available social dynamics, in the process of consolidating unchallenged power. The 
conclusions made by scholars who advance the patrimonial argument are apparently based 
on flawed observations: the astounding ability of most regimes in contemporary sub-Saharan 
Africa to exploit society’s social dynamics and positive values in negative ways. For instance, 
consider the cultural norm of respect of elders. This can be easily manipulated by politicians 
who demand their behaviour not to be put to scrutiny, however unacceptable. The problem 
therefore, as Clapham (1992) suggests, lies in power, in those who control it and how they 
employ it in running the affairs of the state, with complicity of the outside world.  
 
The argument as to complicity of the outside world is supported by Rotberg (2000) who cites 
an example of the Kenya, DRC and Malawi situations; as well as Cockroft (2012) who 
contends that the western world closed an eye to the likes of Mobutu and in their covert 
operations during the cold war. In the Kenya situation, Washington firmly supported Moi’s 
repressive regime to his last days in office. Rotberg (2000) argues that this was partly due to 
the fact that the other ally, Mobutu of the former Zaire was fast losing power in the period. It 
was therefore seen by Washington as a huge loss to see Moi go at the same time.  In Malawi 
western complicity revolved around the dilemma faced by an incoming government in 
dealing with corruption, out of fear of facing destabilization and inefficient use of resources 
that could be more usefully employed in other ways. This paralysed both the domestic 
government and the donor community in dealing with corruption by the previous regime 
(Rotberg 2000; 197, 202).  
 
A further illustration is offered by Soremekun (2000) who notes willingness of the west to 
support the government in Uganda in spite of it being clearly undemocratic, on the 
argument that there are indicators of good governance in the country; as well as the support 
of former regimes in Zaire and Somalia by both the western powers and the former Soviet 
Union. Specifically with Uganda, the British support of Idd Amin presents a very sad 
reminiscence. Arguably, in many of these cases these powers were moved by self-interest 
than moral undergirding. In the past as well as in the present, resources like oil are 
responsible for such stances (Soremekun 2000; 270, 280, 285, 288). Realism and higher 
economic interests, not ethical conduct and justice, become the fundamental yardstick, as an 
observation by Kelsall, Booth, Cammack & Golooba-Mutebi (2010) confirms: 
 
“The Indonesian economic model was wasteful, politically repressive, and 
environmentally destructive. But its growth potential cannot be denied...Indonesia 
thus appears to confirm the idea that ‘In the early stages, a patrimonial political 
structure need not be an obstacle to capitalistic economic development (p. 5) 
 
National interests and political realism is another reason. Koechlin (2013) observes that 
corruption was even seen as one of the strategies in the war machinery against the East in the 
Cold War era, a situation that changed only after the end of the Cold War. She argues on the 
process of political change in Africa in the context of corruption and the political order that: 
 
A particularly telling example is the bribing of foreign officials by international 
companies: until the late nineties, it was not only perfectly acceptable for Northern 
enterprises to give bribes, it was also perfectly normal to expect foreign (Southern) 
officials to take bribes. In other words, corruption was a generally accepted-[tax] 
deductable standard practice in many OECD countries -business as usual. (p. 2) 
 
Koechlin (2013) argues further that [western] scholarly discourse on corruption has 
deliberately or inadvertently, systematically squeezed out the possibility of agency and 
mobilisation’ and the possibility for ‘challenging dominant socio-political imageries, and 
dispossessed African political order of actors, fields and practices of political struggle that 
could or do lead to a ‘viable social order’ (Koechlin 2013, 87). Apparently she is referring to 
absence in western scholarly work on corruption; of the voice of Africans, apparently 
because western scholarship regards itself as possessing both the explanation and the 
solution to the problem. 
 
On their part, the studies by Blundo & De Sardan (2006a, 2006b). while admitting the 
existence of institutionalization and socialization of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa; 
discount the patrimonial explanation offered by several political scientists and political 
sociologists discussed above. Instead they propose a different framework for understanding 
corruption in Africa. Their framework takes the view that corruption in Africa is a 
continuation of the corruption, brutality and extortion that existed during colonial rule. 
(Blundo and De Sardan 2006b). An earlier study (Williams 1987, 33-7, 45) takes the same 
approach, by discounting the ‘culture’ or ‘tradition’ explanation.   
 
Arifari (2006); Blundo (2006); Blundo & De Sardan (2006a & 2006b) and Tijan Alou (2006) 
argue that the state in Africa has over recent years attained what they call ‘privatization and 
personalization of the functions of the state’, which manifests itself in form of corruption at 
all levels. (Arifari 2006, 185-7, Blundo 2006, 37-41, 217-22; Blundo & De Sardan 2006a, 88, 92-
3, 98-100 ; Blundo & De Sardan 2006b, 110-34;  Tijan Alou 2006, 126-7, 158). My argument 
here is that this has been a perpetuation of an order begun immediately after the birth of the 
postcolonial states, which has however been accentuated by the emergence of accelerated 
globalization of the 1960s to the 1980s.  
 
Cockroft 2012 79-101) has documented global corruption trends from the time of Cicero 
(Circa 70 BCE); Francis Bacon (1621 CE); Boss ‘Tweed and the Ring (1860-70s CE) in New 
York; to the Nigerian Mafia of the 1970-2010s and Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s to 2000s. The 
culprits come from different eras and ‘tribes’, but all share three common strand: greed, 
having at their disposal willing accomplices and ‘suppliers’. Further evidence indicate clear 
corruption in the UK two houses ( of Commons and of Lords) in 2011, in US political circles 
as late as 2012, as well as in the arms trade by Swedish and UK companies in 1999.   
 
The logical conclusion therefore is that rent-seeking and corruption cannot be explained 
solely (or even mainly) in cultural terms. Neither should they be viewed as acceptable ways 
of life of a certain people. To do so is to externalize a global social problem and eschew joint 
and severable responsibility.   At worst it stands the risk of driving both its proponents and 
opponents into the error of looking at the issue through racist lenses. To sum up, reasons for 
corruption in sub-Saharan Africa are not dissimilar to those in other parts of the world: Rent-
seeking and corruption are equally driven by several interplaying factors everywhere in the 
world. These include sheer greed; lack of empathy and connection with the populace; 
ineptitude on part of politicians; the quest for inflated ego; the quests for control of natural 
resources and the arms trade among others. The required response therefore, is one of ethical 
frameworks and regulatory mechanisms. This needs further study engaging the interplaying 
factors and actors. As we have seen the corporate world has significant bearing on rent-
seeking. Future studies in the field should therefore focus more on the need to understand 
rent seeking as a historical, global phenomenon that needs to be and addressed on the basis 
of joint efforts by all actors including the corporate world and political communities. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper I have presented a critical outlook of the patrimonial view of rent-seeking. 
Patrimonial concepts of rent-seeking attempt to explain rent seeking in Africa. Evidence 
presented in this paper, as well as evidence from rent-seeking activities globally seems to 
adduce to the view that corruption occurs wherever there are no sufficient checks and 
balances, or where politicians manage to insulate themselves from restraining action. Rent-
seeking in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere should therefore be seen as a menace to which 
several actors are contributing. These actors include politicians; local business communities; 
international business communities; investors and owners of capital for foreign direct 
investment; aid agencies and NGOs; multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the 
IMF; private citizens and seekers of government or public services. More fruitful efforts to 
understand it will therefore be possible only if we abandon partial, escapist concepts in 
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